

MATTHEW BADDORF

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Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Rochester (defense expected May 2017)

Dissertation: Moral Responsibility and Virtue in Organizations
Dissertation Committee: Brett Sherman, Bill FitzPatrick, Ed Wierenga

Bachelors in Philosophy at Covenant College (Spring 2010)

Areas of Specialization

Ethics, Philosophy of Religion

Areas of Competence

Epistemology, Metaphysics, Medieval Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy

Forthcoming Articles

“Phenomenal Consciousness, Collective Mentality, and Collective Moral Responsibility” (*Philosophical Studies*)

“Divine Simplicity, Aseity, and Sovereignty” (*Sophia*)

“Divine Simplicity and Divine Beauty” (*Topoi*)

Presentations

- "Moral Problems for Pragmatic Faith" — Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Division (upcoming Fall 2016)
- "Collective Moral Responsibility or Collective Virtue?" — American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting (Spring 2016)
- "Hope for Divine Perfectionists: A Reply to Hazony" — Young Scholar's Workshop in Jewish Analytic Theology (Fall 2015)
- "Situationism and Soul-Making" — Inaugural Theistic Ethics Workshop at Wake Forest University (Fall 2015); University of Toronto Works-in-Progress Group (Fall 2015)
- "Phenomenal Consciousness, Collective Mentality, and Collective Moral Responsibility" — American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting (Spring 2015)
- "Divine Simplicity and Divine Beauty" — Society of Christian Philosophers Mid-West and Eastern Divisions (Spring and Fall 2014)
- "Does Aseity Support Simplicity?" — Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Division (Fall 2013)
- Comments On "Credence and Correctness: In Defense of the Threshold View" — University of Rochester Graduate Epistemology Conference (Fall 2012)
- "Aquinas' Compatibilism and Manipulation Arguments" — American Catholic Philosophical Society Regional Meeting (Spring 2012)
- "Eternal Functional Subordination: Notes on a Trinitarian Controversy" — Invited lecture at Houghton College (Spring 2012)
- "Moral Causation as an Argument for Moral Realism" — West Chester Graduate Philosophy Conference (Spring 2012)

“A Dilemma for Quine’s Epistemology” — Intermountain Graduate
Conference in Philosophy (Spring 2011)

Teaching

Will graduate with an **Advanced Teaching Certificate** from the University of
Rochester Center for Excellence in Teaching and Learning

As a University of Rochester Instructor:

“‘The Mind’s Best Trick’? The Science and Philosophy of Free Will” — Fall
2016

*Small, writing-intensive freshman composition course focusing on
interdisciplinary issues in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience*

“Money and Morals: Writing about the Ethics of Economics” — Fall 2015
and Spring 2016

*Small, writing-intensive freshman composition course focusing on
interdisciplinary issues in ethics and economics*

“Moral Problems” — Summer 2015

Small, discussion focused freshman-level course in applied ethics

“Justice Without Borders: Writing about Ethics in a Globalized World” —
Fall 2014 and Spring 2015

*Small, writing-intensive freshman composition course focusing on issues
in global ethics*

“Feminist Views of Science” — Fall 2013 and Spring 2014

*Small, writing-intensive freshman composition course focusing on
feminist philosophy of science*

“Would You Press the Button? Navigating Moral Dilemmas” — Summer
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

*Independently-developed one week course in ethics teaching high school
students through a game, debates, role-play, and fiction, as well as more
traditional lecture and discussion*

As a University of Rochester Teaching Assistant:

Philosophy of Law (Spring 2013)	Bennett
Social and Political Philosophy (Fall 2012)	Bennett
Introduction to Philosophy (Spring 2012)	Savage
Public Health Ethics (Fall 2011)	Dees

As a Covenant College Tutor:

Writing Center tutor (volunteer and paid)—2008-2010
Worked with all levels of undergraduate students
Trained to discuss various stages of writing process

Service

Instructional Resources Coordinator for Writing, Speaking, and Argument Program (Summer 2016)

Research assistant for Randall Curren in interdisciplinary project on the measurement of virtue (Fall 2014-Spring 2015)

Referee for *Sophia*

Colloquia Organizer for Writing, Speaking, and Argument Program (Fall 2015-Spring 2016)

New Instructor Mentor for Writing, Speaking, and Argument Program (Fall 2015-Spring 2016)

Graduate Student Association Conference Funding Reviewer (Spring 2014)

Reviewer: University of Rochester Graduate Epistemology Conference (Summer 2012)

University of Rochester Graduate Admissions Committee (Spring 2012)

Graduate Coursework

* Denotes a serious audit

Ethics and Social/Political Philosophy

<i>Reading Group: Rawl's Political Liberalism*</i>	Dees
<i>Seminar: Contemporary Virtue Ethics*</i>	FitzPatrick
<i>Seminar: Non-Naturalism and Moral Epistemology</i>	FitzPatrick
<i>Seminar: Moral Realism and Its Critics (Cornell)</i>	Sturgeon
<i>Seminar: Metaethics</i>	FitzPatrick
<i>Philosophy of Education</i>	Curren

Epistemology

<i>Seminar: Selected Topics in Epistemology</i>	Conee
<i>Writing Seminar: Epistemic Instrumentalism</i>	Feldman
<i>Reading Group: Intuition*</i>	Conee
<i>Reading Group: Selected Topics</i>	Feldman
<i>Reading Group: Collective Epistemology*</i>	Feldman

History of Philosophy/Intellectual History

<i>Seminar: Aristotle on Definition*</i>	Modrak
<i>Reading Group in Medieval Philosophy</i>	Wierenga
<i>Ancient Philosophy</i>	Modrak
<i>British Empiricism</i>	Meerbote
<i>Darwin and Religion</i>	Weslake and Orr

Philosophy of Religion/Philosophical Theology

<i>Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom*</i>	Wierenga
<i>Contemporary Philosophy of Religion</i>	Wierenga
<i>Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement</i>	Wierenga

Metaphysics/Other

<i>Metaphysics Seminar: Free Will</i>	Feldman and Wierenga
<i>Philosophy of Mind Reading Group: Contents of Perception</i>	Weslake
<i>Logical Methods in Philosophy</i>	Ney
<i>Philosophy of Science Seminar: The Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics</i>	Ney

Pedagogy

<i>Writing Pedagogy</i>	Helm and Sydelnik
<i>Practicum in Teaching Writing</i>	Helm and Sydelnik

Awards and Honors

Slattery Fellowship (2010)

Doust Fellowship (2015 and 2016)

Reference List

Dr. Brett Sherman
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Dr. William FitzPatrick
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Dr. Edward Wierenga
Professor of Religion and of Philosophy
University of Rochester
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Dr. Richard Feldman
Professor of Philosophy; Dean of the College
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Jenny Hadingham
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Dissertation

Moral Responsibility and Virtue in Organizations

Abstract:

Our lives are deeply enmeshed in corporations, churches, governments, and other complex organizations. Can these groups—sometimes called collectives—possess moral qualities over and above those of their members? Some have recently argued that they can; for example, BP might be morally responsible for the Gulf oil spill in ways that transcend the responsibility of any individual. Others claim this is a dangerous mistake. My dissertation develops a mixed view on which collectives are capable of some moral qualities, including virtues, but are not capable of independently possessing everything that we might mean by “moral responsibility.”

In chapter 1 I present an account of collective virtue. Individuals typically possess virtues and vices partly on the basis of their mental lives, but collectives lack minds. How then can they possess moral virtues and vices? Despite the fact that they lack genuine minds, collectives can possess close analogues of individual moral and intellectual virtues and vices. These traits are analogues in that they are similar both in functional structure and in their intentional content. I argue that collectives sometimes hold these traits in an irreducible way (for example, a collective can have a virtue or vice even if none of the collective’s members have the analogous individual trait), and I defend my view from recent criticisms of collective virtue.

In chapter 2, I consider collective moral responsibility. As with virtue, individual moral responsibility typically has a mental component, and collectives lack minds. Yet real-world cases of collective wrong-doing make irreducibly collective moral responsibility plausible.

To address this puzzle, I draw on David Shoemaker's work distinguishing between three things that one might mean by the term “moral responsibility.” Two—attributability and answerability—are within the reach of collectives: collectives can be irreducibly attributable in that their actions can stem from their virtues and vices, and irreducibly answerable in that they can reasonably respond to moral criticism. But I argue that collectives cannot be

irreducibly accountable: they are not apt targets for moral anger. I give two arguments for this conclusion. First, their lack of phenomenal consciousness prevents them from experiencing the sort of response moral anger is supposed to elicit. Second, I draw on a recent movement in the philosophy of mind—what Uriah Kriegel calls the phenomenal intentionality research program—to argue that collective accountability is inconsistent with plausible views about the nature of collective intentionality.

In chapter 3, I defend my mixed view against some arguments in the literature. Some argue that collectives can be morally responsible *tout court*, while others argue that collectives cannot be morally responsible in any sense. Both arguments present apparent problems for my view that collectives can be answerable but not accountable. In response, I argue that proponents and opponents of collective moral responsibility have often argued past each other by assuming different senses of moral responsibility. In particular, proponents of collective moral responsibility have offered arguments that, at best, establish only collective answerability. Their opponents, meanwhile, have implicitly taken collective accountability as their target. Thus, neither sort of argument offers problems for my view, and appreciation of the answerability/accountability distinction can defuse much of the debate.

Moreover, examining the collective moral responsibility controversy in this way can help us evaluate Shoemaker's own theory of individual moral responsibility. Shoemaker argues that we should distinguish between three different senses of moral responsibility because this distinction helps us make the most sense out of “marginal cases”—cases in which we are torn between thinking agents are and are not responsible. Shoemaker appeals to cases involving individuals with a variety of mental health disorders as examples. Expanding our gaze to collectives as additional marginal cases provides further tests of his theory, and so examining collective moral responsibility can contribute to wider debates in ethics.

In my conclusion, I briefly explore some upshots of my arguments for social and legal punishment for collectives. The desire to vindicate (or condemn) such punishment has played a large role in motivating research into collective moral traits, and I argue that while their lack of accountability precludes some motivations for collective punishment, answerability and

attributability justify a forward-looking system of punishment. When constructed properly, such a system can avoid the moral objections to collective punishment while fulfilling the social goals of collective moral responsibility theorists. A nuanced account of the moral responsibility and virtue of collectives can therefore help us make progress on practical questions about how to best treat the organizations that play such important roles in our world.